

Thinking Aesthetic Reality (with Simondon)

By Ludovic Duhem (translation reviewed by Mark Hayward)

Problem's conditions

“Thinking aesthetic reality with Simondon”. As a philosophical program, this title presupposes three things: first, it presupposes that something called “aesthetic reality” exists and can be distinguished from reality in general; second, it presupposes that this “aesthetic reality” can be thought using the method and notions devised by Simondon; third, and more subtly, that we must think “aesthetic reality” *with* Simondon, which is to say that aesthetic reality poses a problem for Simondon’s philosophy.

Each of these three presuppositions involves their own difficulties:

1. The first presupposition presents an *ontological* difficulty, as it requires a criterion by means of which one can distinguish “aesthetic reality” from reality in general.

1.1 If “aesthetic reality” is defined as what is *sensible*, that is, that which is perceptible by the senses, then all reality is aesthetic. At least, all reality is *capable* of being known through the senses as an empirical or ideal reality. Aesthetic reality would just be a way of seeing reality in general and not a specific domain. However, the search for a criterion that would allow us to discriminate aesthetic reality from reality in general could not be satisfied by such a definition. Furthermore, contrary to empiricism and phenomenology, Simondon does not give primacy to perception either ontologically or epistemologically. Indeed, if perception is a separate form of individuation in itself¹, it is nothing more than a level of knowledge of reality as a whole, which is always a mix of perception and construction².

1.2 If “aesthetic reality” is defined as what is *intentionally* produced through aesthetic assessment, then the criterion for discriminating between aesthetic reality and reality in general *depends* on either the creator-subject or the receptor-subject.

1.2.1 Yet defining “aesthetic reality” in terms of the aesthetic intention of the creator-subject, beyond telling us nothing about the meaning of the term “aesthetic”, is a problem as an intention has never defined the identity of a thing. For example, an object can be intentionally aesthetic and receive a functional or economic assessment. Conversely, as Simondon shows us, a technical object can be assessed aesthetically even when no aesthetic intention has *determined* the

¹ Gilbert Simondon, *L'individuation à la lumière des notions de forme et d'information*, III, Chapitre premier, §5, *La problématique perceptive*, Paris, Ed. Millon, pp. 243-244. (For the remainder of the essay, this text will be referred to as *ILFI*.)

² Gilbert Simondon, “*Analyse des critères de l'individualité*”, in *ILFI*, p. 554.

conception or realization of its functioning³. However, according to Simondon, such an aesthetic assessment is not valid when it is based on the formal and material aspects or on the non-functional appendixes of the object; an aesthetic assessment is only valid when it is based upon the functional *knowledge* of the object's nature⁴. We can learn two lessons here: on the one hand, intention is not a sufficient criterion for defining aesthetic reality; on the other hand, intention itself is always submitted to assessment, this is to say that it depends on the *judgment* of the receptor-subject since intention is itself evaluated according to its adequacy in relation to ends both known and postulated (the successful work traditionally being conceived as one where the intentions of the artist, the technical means used and the aesthetic appreciation of the receptor-subject coincide.) Therefore, not only is intention inseparable from appreciation, but even when known and identified as such, intention gives the illusion that the reality and aesthetic quality of the object depends exclusively on it. Yet, it is precisely against the intentionalist and finalist conception of production found in the hylemorphic tradition that Simondon elaborates his theory of individuation and technique. This is because, in opposing form and matter, the hylemorphic tradition privileges form as the subject's creative intention, which obscures the necessary conditions and operations for the realization of the work. In other words, this tradition denies the process of individuation as such.⁵ Therefore, in order to avoid the finalist illusion of intentional conception, it is necessary to relativize the implicit ontological privilege granted the creator-subject when it comes to the intentional definition of aesthetic reality.

1.2.2 But if we transfer all of the ontological responsibilities to the receptor-subject, other difficulties arise. Aesthetic assessment by the receptor is not necessarily *adequate* in relation to the aesthetic intention of the creator. Therefore, an aesthetic assessment is at the same time conditional, singular, variable and independent. It is *conditional* because it depends on the theoretical and practical conditions that are defined, reconfigured and completed as much by the subject as the object. It is *singular* because it is equally individual and collective; it depends on the aesthetic norms and cultural values of the subject. It is *variable* because it can be profoundly

³ “Generally speaking, any dressing up of technical objects as aesthetic objects produces an unpleasant impression of being fake; it looks like a lie made material. But, in certain cases, there exists a beauty proper to technical objects. This beauty appears when these objects are embedded in a world, whether geographic or human. Aesthetic impressions are, therefore, relative to its embedding. It is like a gesture... The technical object is not beautiful in just any circumstance or place. It is beautiful when it encounters a singular and remarkable place in the world. The high-tension line is beautiful when it spans a valley, a car when it turns, a train when it enters or exits a tunnel. The technical object is beautiful when it encounters a ground which is suitable, for which it can be the correct figure. This is to say, when it achieves and expresses the world.” Gilbert Simondon, *Du mode d'existence des objets techniques*, Paris, Ed. Aubier, 1989, p. 185. (For the remainder of the essay, this text will be referred to as *MEOT*.)

⁴ “This is why the discovery of beauty in technical objects cannot be left to perception alone. It is necessary for the function of the object to be understood and thought. To say this in another way, a technical education is necessary in order for the beauty of technical objects to appear as part of the way in which technical concepts are inserted into the universe and as important points of this universe.” *MEOT*, p 186. “Technical beauty” is, therefore, always the result of a mixture of *cognitive judgment* (involving theoretical and practical knowledge) and *aesthetic judgment* (involving sensible appreciation.)

⁵ Simondon develops his critique of the hylemorphic scheme in the introduction of *ILFI*, specifically in the first chapter, “Forme et matière, I. – Fondements du schème hylémorphique. Technologie de la prise de forme”, *ILFI* pp. 39-51.

modified by the encounter with the object, by new knowledge or by an experience of the immediate aesthetic assessment. It is also variable in the chronological and topological sense ; we can aesthetically assess a moment or part of aesthetic reality, a work of art for example, without appreciating the totality. It is *independent* because it is not *founded* on knowledge of aesthetic intention and it doesn't seek any knowledge of this intention. Consequently, it is also difficult to define aesthetic reality using the criterion of aesthetic assessment: it is neither discriminating nor stable. So, we must also *relativize* the implicit ontological privilege assigned to the receptor-subject.

1.3 Another definition of “Aesthetic reality” is that reality which is *produced* by artists.

1.3.1 According to this definition, “aesthetic reality” is *artistic* reality. Thus, we transfer the ontological problem from the subject to the object. It is the object that has in itself the ontological criterion according to which it differs from all other things. Intention and assessment are no longer necessary to define the aesthetic reality; it would be enough to deeply examine the *properties* of a given aesthetic object. Now, according to what criteria could we bring together these aesthetic objects in such a way that we could establish a consistent, yet varied, ordered classification? Not only must such a criterion bring together these objects, such as they have been gathered historically, but it is necessary to provide a real *exhaustivity* in order to define the common characteristics of the objects forming aesthetic reality. We must not forget that artistic reality is also composed of attitudes and gestures, sound and musical modulations, words and images, which are objects only in a *metaphorical* sense and over which historical conservation is quasi powerless.

1.3.2 But the greatest difficulty lies in the fact that since the advent of modern art, the definition of art has become *extensive*, that is to say that all categories around which genders and species of art were stabilized have collapsed, thereby disseminating art in an infinite potential of forms and objects. The idea that there exists the “ontological problem of the work of art” as posed by the practices of modern artist is valid, but the problem is one of genesis and the condition of knowledge for genesis rather than one of identity. Concretely, focusing on the problem of the identity of the aesthetic object—in the tradition of numerous analytic aestheticians since Goodman—brings to light the *reality* of the object, which is its genesis. The true identity of the aesthetic object cannot be found in logic, since it does not depend on the *structures* of language. Nor can its identity be found in culture, since it cannot be completely subsumed by the given *norms*.⁶ Nor can its identity be historical, since it cannot be reduced to a specific *time*. Instead, the identity of the aesthetic object is the entire process of individuation that confers the object with existence, haecceity and meaning. The true identity of the aesthetic object is *genetic*, which is to say *relational* and *potential*; this means that its identity cannot be reduced to the metaphysical principles of unity, coherence and stability. If modern art poses an ontological problem, it is not the problem of the identity of the work of art but that of the genesis and the conditions of

⁶ “Every act, every thing, every moment has within it the capacity of becoming a remarkable point in a new reticulation of the universe. Every culture selects acts and situations that are likely to become these remarkable points, but it is not culture that creates the likelihood of a situation to become remarkable. Culture only creates barriers around certain kinds of situations, allowing aesthetic expression along narrow paths in comparison with the spontaneity of aesthetic impression. Culture intervenes more as a limit than as a creative force.” *MEOT*, p. 181.

knowledge of the genesis of the aesthetic object in general. In this sense, modern art displays the *metastability* of the work of art, this is to say that it affirms its identity by means of a relative indetermination. This indetermination gives to the aesthetic object both the power to draw in non-artistic realities and the ability to extend outwards in space and time. It is this double power that explains the aesthetic extensivity of art. Therefore, the ontology of aesthetic reality is also a false problem.

1.3.3 The real problem of “aesthetic reality” is ontogenetic. But thinking “aesthetic reality” as an ontogenetic problem means that, if we follow the restrictions put forward by Simondon in the book on technical objects, we cannot treat “aesthetic reality” as a delimited field (i.e. the field of art⁷.) Simondon’s understanding of aesthetic reality is in direct contradiction with the idea that “aesthetic reality is artistic reality.” Simondon suggests that aesthetic reality is at the same time deeper and vaster than art, at least if the latter term is taken to mean an *institutional* sense of art. Therefore, it is necessary to rule out assigning ontological privilege to the object as a way of compensating for the ontological privilege assigned to the subject in the definitions of others. This is why Simondon insists on the fact that aesthetic reality is an expression of a “fundamental tendency of human beings” to look for perfection and totality in acts and to look for the analogous phenomena of primitive unity⁸. Aesthetic reality must itself be incorporated into all fields so as to make each field able to exceed its own first limits and become transductive. This is to say (and I quote): “a localized reality is given the power of passing into other places and other times⁹.” According to Simondon, if art has any power it is the power to “make things transductive”¹⁰. Consequently, we can say that artistic reality also has to be “relativizes” in order to be known ontogenetically. We’ll observe, however, that art can serve as a *paradigm* for aesthetic reality, not because artistic reality is easier to know, but because the aesthetic dimension is more stable and more intense in it.

2. The second difficulty is *epistemological* because it postulates the universality of the method and notions made by Simondon.

⁷ “As for aesthetic thought, it has *never been a limited domain or of a determined kind*, but only a tendency. It is that which maintains the function of the totality.” *MEOT*, p. 179. Emphasis added.

⁸ “ In order for works of art to be possible, it is necessary that they be made possible by means of a *fundamental tendency of the human being*, and by the capacity to experience aesthetic impressions in certain real and vital circumstances. As part of a civilization, the work of art uses aesthetic impressions and satisfies, sometimes in an artificial and illusory manner, the tendency of man to search for the compliment to the totality while exercising a certain kind of thought. It is not sufficient to say that the work of art shows nostalgia for magical thinking. In fact, the work of art provides the equivalent of magical thinking because, in a given situation and according to a structure of *analogic relation*, it recovers a universalizing continuity in relation to other situations and other possible realities. The work of art remakes a reticular universe, at least for perception. But the work of art does not truly reconstruct the primitive magical universe; the aesthetic universe is partial, contained and embedded in the real and actual universe that is the product of the splitting. *MEOT*, p. 180.

⁹ “Art does not make eternal but rather *renders transductive*, giving to a localized and closed reality the power to move to other places and times.” *MEOT*, p. 200. Emphasis added.

¹⁰ *Idem*.

In the “Remarque liminaire” of *Analyse des critères de l’individualité*¹¹, Simondon specifies what is at stake in the fact that his method refuses any identity between the rational and the real¹². The epistemology of Simondon is strictly anti-substantialist. Therefore, it is not possible to explain reality using self-given principles or universal terms. He expands on this point, writing that “this work will explore the hypothesis that neither realism nor nominalism can be rigorously followed. This work will touch upon a critique of universals and put into question those ways of thinking that presume classifications according to simple kinds and specific differences¹³.” Consequently, we cannot adopt a posture that would consist of the application of a conceptual theory of objects. First, the theory of individuation is not a collection of categories of thought and independent operational concepts. Whether it concerns the individuation of a field or being, Simondon’s thought exists on the same ontological level as its object¹⁴. Second, the theory of individuation is not *prior* to its object, since it *precedes* ontology and critique, yet is, at the same time, a consequence of knowledge. Simondon explains this point, writing that “the ontology of the individual will be unveiled through the becoming of epistemology, and the principles of possible axiology will be born from this examination to the degree that it will provide the foundations for an understanding of value capable of integrating in a single act the auto-constitution of knowledge of ontological reality and epistemological signification¹⁵.” Third, the analogical method necessary for any knowledge of individuation, and therefore, knowledge of aesthetic reality, “must authorize the intellectual transfer from one domain to another by means of the necessary conversions¹⁶.” This implies the exclusion of all epistemological hierarchy between the fields and validates the idea of a “possible axiology” of aesthetic reality derived from the artistic paradigm. The *epistemological condition* of ontogenetic knowledge of the aesthetic reality is in fact the *transduction* of knowledge.

3. The third difficulty is *methodological*, as “thinking aesthetic reality” is a problem put to the philosophy of Simondon.

3.1 An autonomous aesthetic doctrine does not exist in the philosophy of Simondon. His reflections on art and the senses are disseminated across his work and do not have much unity or

¹¹ *ILFI*, pp. 553-558.

¹² “This postulate [which confers ontological status to the relation] *cannot be* considered as relying on a method or doctrine that *assumes the identity of the rational and the real*” *ILFI*, p. 553. Emphasis added.

¹³ “This work will attempt to develop the hypothesis that neither realism nor nominalism are rigorously valid. This work hopes to offer a critique of universals and specifically put into question thought which assumes classification by common kinds and specific differences.” *ILFI*, p. 553.

¹⁴ This follows the logic implied by transduction: “Transduction corresponds to existence of those relations which are born as pre-individual being individuates itself; transductions is both expresses individuation and allows it to be thought. Transduction is, therefore, a notion that is at once metaphysical and logical. It applies to ontogenesis and is ontogenesis itself.” *ILFI*, p. 33.

¹⁵ *ILFI*, p. 555.

¹⁶ *ILFI*, p. 555.

systematicity. The text “*Sur la techno-esthétique*”¹⁷, his most sustained discussion of aesthetics, is in fact only an overview. Two options are possible: either we adopt a reconstructive method with the available material or we invent a parallel doctrine that only conserves the skeleton of Simondon’s theories. The advantage of the first option is that it might develop in harmony with the spirit of Simondon’s thought and be able to adapt Simondon’s thought on a case-by-case basis. But the risk is that we force the thought of Simondon into adapting to a foreign field. It is not sufficient to work from the premise of the universality of the transductive method and attempt a schematic adaptation to the problem of aesthetic reality. First, the incompatibilities between Simondon’s writing and aesthetic reality develop on two distinct levels: an *intertextual* level and an *intratextual* level, each expressing the internal tensions to be found across Simondon’s thought. At an intertextual level, there exists a *major incompatibility* between the theory of phases of being described in *ILFI* and phases of culture outlined in *MEOT*. This incompatibility can be resolved through a *critical dialogue* with the thought of Simondon. It is necessary to remove art from the frame of “residual finalism” imposed on it with the theory of cultural phases in order to re-inscribe it in *ILFI*, following the idea that, according to this work, “art is transductive”. There also exist minor incompatibilities between different texts and theories that have neither the same philosophical status nor the same explicative power. The entire secondary corpus formed by the recently published course notes and lectures fall under this intertextual incompatibility. In these courses, there is a global coherence between ontology, technology and psychology¹⁸. Meanwhile, on the intratextual plan, numerous passages show that reconstructive option is particularly difficult, due to the allusive or illustrative nature of these passages, which relate either to an external theory of aesthetic reality or which lack any analyses of whatsoever of works of art.

3.2 The second option, a parallel doctrine, has the advantage of not raising problems of internal coherence in, and interpretation of, the thought of Simondon. But it postulates an immediate equation between the rational and the real, a position that is categorically rejected by Simondon as it is the opposite of his epistemology. This option ignores and denies the methodological and notional reformulations undertaken by Simondon and, because of this, offers a logical reversal in the passage from ontology to ontogenesis by means of knowledge. The positive results obtained by such a doctrine are surface effects, having only a temporary efficacy that at the same time ultimately paralyzes the mind.

3.3 The only possibility for thinking aesthetic reality, outside metaphysical principles and the aporias of analytical and phenomenological aesthetics, is to realize an individuation of the thought of Simondon by taking on the internal tensions of his philosophy. We must think aesthetic reality as a problem for the thought of Simondon that can only be resolved by

¹⁷ Gilbert Simondon, “*Sur la techno-esthétique*”, in *Cahiers du Collège International de Philosophie*, N°12, Paris, Ed. Collège International de philosophie, 1992.

¹⁸ Gilbert Simondon, *Cours sur la perception*, Chatou, Ed. La transparence, 2007 ; Gilbert Simondon, *Imagination et invention*, Chatou, Ed. La Transparence, 2008 ; Gilbert Simondon, *Communication et information*, Chatou, Ed. la Transparence, 2010.

amplifying the explicative potential of his work¹⁹. Thinking aesthetic reality with Simondon then means it is necessary to insert this problem into his philosophy in order to extend it, in much the same way that art prolongs nature and social reality. We need to answer to the noetic call of Simondon's thought, that is to say to create a new reticulation of key-points of his philosophy, or even of philosophy itself, where aesthetics remains a problem.

Preliminary theses for thinking Aesthetic Reality

I conclude by offering a series of preliminary theses that seek to establish the bases of a *complete* thinking of aesthetic reality. It involves a collection of theses that correspond to my personal interpretation of Simondon's thought. I call this *Techno-aesthetics*, and offer it as an *extension* of Simondon's work.²⁰ By this I mean, it is a philosophical individuation of his work that is embedded in his thought and goes further than his work in a manner that develops both the *potential* that it contains and offers a *critique* of the internal tensions it raises when confronting the problem of the aesthetic:

1. Aesthetic reality is the *system* of aesthetic individuals.

1.2. As a *system*, aesthetic reality is not composed of given objects, but of *relations*.

1.3. As a *system of relations*, aesthetic reality links together aesthetic individuals in a *network* manner while we also assert that each aesthetic individual is itself a relation, a relation between the individual and an associated milieu, at the same time. Aesthetic reality is therefore relational in two senses: it is the relation between individuals and these individuals are themselves relations since they are coupled with an associated milieu.

1.4. Aesthetic reality is therefore a *relational system between relations*.

1.5. Aesthetic reality is *intensive* because all human actions, everything in the world, every produced object can be a part of aesthetic reality according to the degree of structuration of its *aesthetic charge*. However, art is a paradigmatic of aesthetic reality as a field, limited as such but *extensive*, in which the aesthetic charge is associated with all levels of individual reality.

2. The aesthetic individual is not a substance; it is more than a thing and less than an object. The aesthetic individual emerges from a process of genesis or "individuation" which gives it consistence, haecceity and signification.

¹⁹ I explain the nature of this development of Simondon in greater detail in Ludovic Duhem, *La tache aveugle et le point neutre. Note sur le double faux départ de l'esthétique chez Simondon*, in *Cahiers Simondon*, N°1, pp. 115-134, Paris, Ed. L'Harmattan.

²⁰ An earlier version of this "techno-aesthetic" can be found in Ludovic Duhem, *Introduction à la techno-esthétique*, in *Archée, revue de théorie et de critique d'art numérique*, Janvier 2010, www.archee.qc.ca.

2.1. As an individuation, the aesthetic individual is the resolution to a problem. In order for a problem to exist, it needs conditions of *metastability* and a *disparation between two orders of magnitude*.²¹ Matter, perception and action at the same time determine the conditions of metastability; they concern a creator-subject, a created-object, and a receptor-subject. Disparity is the incompatibility between a *superior* order of magnitude and the aesthetic individual (i.e. the *sacred* and an *inferior* order of magnitude to the aesthetical individual, *nature*.) The aesthetic individual is therefore the resolution of a communication problem by mediation between the natural world and the human world.

2.3. The aesthetic individual is the resolution of a *double* problem: aesthetic *and* technical: “Technical” because every individual blends into itself *operational schemes, materials and available tools and instruments* which define structural and formal lines of action; “Aesthetic» because every aesthetic individual structures its *perceptive and symbolical potentials*.

2.4. Every aesthetic individual is techno-aesthetic. There are no pure aesthetic individuals nor are there pure technical individuals. The techno-aesthetic individual will sometimes be dominated by the technical and sometimes dominated by the aesthetic; this depends on the degree to which the *technical features* have been integrated and intensity and form of the *aesthetic features*. The difference between a technical object and an aesthetical object is determined by the *ratio* between aesthetical charge and technical charge. This ratio is not a structural ratio but an *operative* ratio because all phases of individual genesis are techno-aesthetical.

2.5. The aesthetic individual is therefore the result of a process of techno-individual individuation which structures the potentials of pre-individual reality, a reality which accompanies individuated beings in all phases in the form of an associated milieu.

2.6. The *techno-aesthetic associated milieu* accompanies and conditions the creator-subject, created-object and receptor-subject. This associated milieu is composed by operative and structural *schemes*, perceptival and formal *potentials*, significations and values *trends*.

3. The artist is not a creator but an *inventor*. At the very least, we must think operations of aesthetic individuation outside of a principle of creation that defines the origin of creation as an unexplainable absolute and denies its conditions of genesis. The aesthetic individual, the work of art or otherwise, is never a *creatio ex nihilo* but an *inventio in rem*.

3.1. Aesthetic invention, as a constructive phase of reality, remains a specific mode of existence for the inventor. This mode of existence is a kind of *dis-individuation* in relation to the norms and values that constrain social reality as a structure for integration. This “dis-individuation” is at the same time an *insensitivity to the practical exigencies* of social life and a *sensitivity to the remarkable points of time and space* within the natural *and* human world. This complementary process of de-sensibilization and sensibilization is the preparatory phase for the operation of invention as such.

²¹ Simondon borrows the concept of 'disparation' from optical science where it refers to the two complementary images formed in each eye during visual perception (also referred to in English as 'retinal disparity.' These non-correspondent images make possible perception of the depth through the synthesis realized by the optical chiasma and the visual cortex in the brain. Generalized by Simondon, this concept defines the relation of non-communication between two magnitude orders that makes an process of individuation possible.

3.2. The preparatory phase of aesthetic invention is a demand for the aesthetic individuation of reality, that is to say a search for complementarity between the remarkable points of time and space, between the material, formal and functional elements of reality. That's why, in the second phase, which is the central phase of aesthetic individuation, the act of invention is no longer a dis-individuation in which the inventor *feels* the pre-individual reality of the world in a strictly subconscious manner. Rather, it is the real individuation of the subject and the object, of the subject *through* the invention of the object. This phase is intuitive, that is to say transductive in a *constructive* sense, without being totally reflexive. This is due to the *margin of indetermination* that allows for the possibility of modifying production *during* the organization of elements. This means that the act of invention act is also the resolution of a problem and not the execution of a plan, which explain its normative power.

3.3. Aesthetic invention cannot be understood as a form imposed on matter, a result of the abstract and reductive *hylemorphic schema*, on the part of either the subject or the object. This schema conserves an implicit substantialism due to the double privileging of form which occurs when importance is awarded to the intention of the subject and the execution of the object. Aesthetic invention is implicated before the application of pure form on raw matter. Thus, according to the molding paradigm, form is already the result of a techno-aesthetic operation because the matter needs to be prepared in order to construct form.

3.4. The aesthetic individual is the *communicative act* between two techno-aesthetic relations: a techno-aesthetic relation of the form and a techno-aesthetic of the matter. The aesthetic individual is therefore a *three-term relation* made up of three individuation operations.

3.5. Moreover, this relation is itself relative since the aesthetic individual as a complete reality is also a three-term relation: inventor-subject – invented-object – receptor-subject. These are at the same time the *three non-linear phases* of aesthetic individuation (since they are synergetic and are present across the levels of the aesthetic individual itself.) The aesthetic individual is central to the invented-object, serving as a mediating structure that realizes the communication between previously separate inventor-subject and the receptor-subject.

3.6. The complete aesthetic relation is therefore a three-term relation: individuation of the inventor-subject – individuation of the invented-object – individuation of the receptor-subject. The two individuations of the subject are reciprocal in relation with central individuation.

3.7. This double relation of conversion between an operation in structure and a structure in operation (subject-object ; object-subject) is an allagmatic split or "*synallagmatic*".

4. Signification offers real potential for the aesthetic individual. It serves as a support for a *new* individuation that has the particular attribute of being detachable and transposable from one field to another. We could call this the *political power* of aesthetic reality, that is to say its capacity to become a *symbol* for the community, a symbol that is normative and critical at the same time, in fact it is normative because critical.

4.1. The aesthetic individual is the outcome of transindividual individuation, because it demands the existence of a subject to imagine it, to will it, to produce it and a collective to receive it and

interpret it; it is also the origin of a new transindividual individuation by means of which a subjective emotion becomes a plan and content for a common culture.

4.2. The aesthetic individual is more than techno-aesthetic; it is already transindividual and therefore shows that all techno-aesthetic individuation is transindividual and vice-versa.

4.3. The aesthetic individual is the resolution of a psycho-social problem by means of a techno-aesthetic structure. It is a problem of *sensibility* for the *transindividual* and a problem of *sensibility* of the *transindividual* that bring about a disparity between the inventor-subject and the collectivity. This disparity creates an *anxiety* that requires mediation. The aesthetic individual serves as a intermediary between the psychic world of the subject who has isolated himself from society for a moment to take the risk of invention (in the manner of the pure individual) and the collective world of society which cannot integrate immediately those who are not in the group. Aesthetic invention is the *mode of participation* of the inventor-subject in the collective, this participatory mode radiating through works as a way to prolong his actions beyond death.

4.4. Aesthetic invention is a *mode of transindividuality*. It is a new reticulation of the Universe that opens the horizon of a sense to come.

5. After all is said and done, we cannot know aesthetic reality in an *ontological* or *historical* sense. We only individuate, individuate ourselves and individuate in us the sense of aesthetic reality that art propagates transductively following the pulsations of ontogenesis.